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Strong and Jacobsen: Damages for Wrongful Death

SUCH DAMAGES AS ARE JUST: A PROPOSAL
FOR MORE REALISTIC COMPENSATION IN
WRONGFUL DEATH CASES
R. Keith Strong* and William D. Jacobsen**
In every action [for wrongful death] such damages may be given
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The lawyer who ventures into the realm of damages available
to the estate and heirs of one who has been wrongfully killed sometimes feels as Alice must have when she walked through the looking glass. On every side are arbitrary rules. Distinctions visible to
only the keenest eye take lawyer and client to vastly different results. One obvious example is the small difference between the two
types of suit for death-the so-called "wrongful death" and "survival" actions. The survivors of a decedent who died instantaneously have a wrongful death action.' The deceased who happened
to survive his injuries for an appreciable length of time leaves two
lawsuits. The survivors have a wrongful death action; his own personal injury action survives his death to be prosecuted by the administrator of his estate.' This second action is called the survival
action. The person is no less dead in either case, but if by chance
death is slightly lingering the damages rules change. The survival
suit has its own arbitrary rules. The vagaries of damages in the
survival suit have been recently discussed."
One facet of the law of damages in the wrongful death action
is so peculiar that it bears examination. Survivors' damages are derivative only. They may not recover for the grief, mental anguish
and emotional distress the wrongful act causes them regardless of
how severe.' Damages in a wrongful death case are said to be computed by measuring the pecuniary loss caused the plaintiffs by the
decedent's death. This "pecuniary loss" rule also applies in a suit
over the wrongful death of a child or an elderly person who is not
* Partner with Great Falls law firm of Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams; J.D. with
high honors, University of Montana School of Law, 1974.
** B.A., Stanford University, 1979; J.D., University of Montana School of Law, 1982.
1. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 27-1-323 (1981).
2. Dillon v. Great N. Ry. Co., 38 Mont. 485, 100 P. 960 (1909).
3. Id.
4. Smith, Thoughts on the Survival Action in Montana and Related Matters, 41
MONT. L. REv. 165 (1980).
5. Listen v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 500, 223 P. 507, 513 (1924).
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making monetary contributions. Montana courts specifically refuse
to compensate the heirs for their own grief. This article discusses
that rule.
Grief, the mental and emotional anguish and shock accompanying the loss of a loved one, can be one of life's most traumatic
experiences. The extensive effect of grief on phvsical and mental
health has been the object of considerable medical and psychological research; as a result medical literature is filled with documentation of the physical and emotional damage caused by bereavement.6 The devastating effects of bereavement are the theme for
much of the world's great literature. Common sense and experience
tell us the same thing. The profound physical and mental effect of
grief is so obvious as to require no further discussion.
It seems that there would have to be a compelling justification
for a rule of law that automatically denies everyone any recovery
for their grief, even though the wrongful act of someone else
caused it. This would seem particularly true when we recall that in
the survival action administrators of the estates of decedents may
recover for the mental and emotional distress of the dead person
7
who is not even present to testify.
A search for a justification for this rule of law leads to several
places. One way to seek to understand the rule is to follow the
development of Montana's law of damages in wrongful death actions. Another is to compare the losses Montana law does compensate with the reasons that have been advanced to support the
Montana rule denying recovery for grief. It is also useful to consider whether any other jurisdictions allow damages of this nature.
An examination of all these areas leaves one conclusion: the rule is
an unnecessary relic of nineteenth century English social policy.
The common law courts created it. It is time they changed it.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF THE

RULE

statutes8

The Montana wrongful death
do not distinguish between grief and any other type of damage the heirs may have suffered. The principal statute is Montana Code Annotated [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 21-1-323 (1981). It reads: "In every action [for
wrongful death], such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just." Montana has not allowed recovery of damages to be as unrestricted as the statute's wording
6. The National Library of Medicine's Index Medicus, January-June 1981 Supplement, alone, has 26 entries under the subject "grief."
7. Marinkovich v. Tierney, 93 Mont. 72, 86, 17 P.2d 93, 96 (1932).
8. MCA §§ 27-1-323, -512, -513 (1981).
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would indicate. Montana follows what is called the pecuniary loss
rule.' In doing so Montana, together with the majority of states in
the United States,1 0 has followed the English interpretation of
Lord Campbell's Act, 1 that recovery for wrongful death is limited
to what is called the pecuniary loss suffered by the survivors."2
Lord Ellenborough first said in Baker v. Bolton13 that at the
common law there could be no recovery for the wrongful death of a
person. In 1846, the British Parliament enacted Lord Campbell's
Act to change all that. It reads in pertinent part:
[W]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default . . . such as would have entitled the parties
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have
been liable if death had not insued shall be liable ....
[A]nd in every such action the jury may give Such damages as
they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such
death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit
such action shall be brought ....
Lord Campbell's Act, like the Montana statute today, does not restrict the jury by imposing limits on how it computes these
damages.
The English courts soon imposed their own limitations. The
first and still leading case is Ellen Blake v. The Midland Railway
Co.," decided in 1852. John Blake was killed when two of the defendants' trains collided. The railroad company admitted liability;
the case proceeded to trial to determine damages. 6 The trial judge
instructed the jury that, although the plaintiff's primary loss was
loss of support, the jury might also award her an amount to com17
pensate the widow for her emotional pain.
The appellate court reversed the resulting judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that the jury had been improperly instructed on
9.

MONTANA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE, Instruction 31.00,

Damages for Wrongful Death

of an Adult.
10. See generally 1 S.

SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:1 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SPEISER]. See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 906-07 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
11. Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 1846, 9 & 10
Vict., c. 93.
12. Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (QB 1852).
13. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (KB 1808). See generally 1 SPEISER, supra note 10, at §§ 1:1
through -:7. See also PROSSER, supra note 10, at 901-02.
14. 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
15. 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (QB 1852).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 41.
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damages and that any award for Mrs. Blake's suffering was improper. The court stated, "The title of this Act may be some guide
to its meaning: and it is 'An Act for Compensating the Families of
Persons Killed;' not for solacing their wounded feelings ....
The court decided that damages are limited to those "admitting of
a pecuniary estim.."atC."' Th.e. court gave few...reao.. .T said that
the Act provides for a wrongful death action, not one for survival;
it does not continue the decedent's personal injury action but provides an entirely different remedy. 20 The court seemed to believe
that any other rule would be impossible for the jury to follow:
[T]he measure of damages is not the loss or suffering of the deceased, but the injury resulting from his death to his family. This
language seems more appropriate to a loss of which some estimate
may be made than to an indefinite sum independent of all pecuniary estimate to soothe the feelings ....
We conceive that the Legislature would not have thrown
upon the jury such great difficulty in calculating and apportioning
the solatium to the different members of the family without some
rules for their guidance.2
The Blake case was subsequently followed in the majority of
American jurisdictions.2 From this one case arose two rules: damages in a wrongful death action are limited to the pecuniary loss of
the survivors, and there is no recovery for the mental anguish of
the survivors.

III.

THE REASONS FOR THE RULE

Only one reason is advanced for the rule. No recovery can be
given for the mental anguish of the survivors because a jury cannot
estimate that sort of damage. One of the cases most frequently
cited for that notion, an 1874 Colorado case, Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Miller,2 8 provides this rationale:
[U]pon what known principle can the mental sufferings of the
survivors be estimated. If the family is large, and the grief proportioned to its size, then the damages would be immense. If the
family was small but the grief boundless, how could it be composed. How could a jury estimate the relative mental anguish of a
widow and twelve children. Furthermore, it would involve a min18. Id. at 42.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
See 1 SPEISER, supra note 10, at § 3:52.
2 Colo. 442 (1874).
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ute scrutiny into the personal relations of all parties. Affection
would have to be measured by a graduated scale. An account
would have to be taken of the familiarity which existed between
the deceased and the survivors. If a confirmed drunkard, or a person of vile associations, the grief at his departure might not be so
poignant.
If the widow had wearied of her lord, or the husband of his
wife, death might be a joy instead of an anguish. How determine
the duration of this mental suffering or the degree of its intensity? When a large number of survivors were found, an inquiry
would have to be instituted into the feelings of each. This certainly might, in many instances tend to scandal and disgrace.
Neither the interests of the litigants nor the policy of the law
could be subserved by such a course. None of these difficulties are
encountered in estimating the mental suffering in the case of one
suing for direct injuries to himself; his relations to others are in
no sense material; it is a personal, not a relative, suffering. "
The gist of the argument seems be that grief cannot be measured,
much less proved. Therefore, no recovery will be attempted.
This belief that the jury cannot measure the survivors' mental
suffering traces its origins to the first decision on the subject,
Blake v. Midland Ry. Co.," in which the court stated:
There may be a calculation of the pecuniary loss sustained by the
different members of the family from the death of one of them
but if the jury were to proceed to estimate the respective degrees
of mental anguish of a widow and twelve children for the death of
the father of the family, a serious danger might arise of damages
26
being given to the ruin of the defendants.

Both the Blake and Miller cases confine the plaintiffs to recovery
for only lost contributions. These two cases provide the only rationale for the rule; this reasoning will be examined in a subsequent
section. Montana, without any justification at all, followed the
same approach in Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co.,27 when first
faced with the question.

IV. THE RULE IN MONTANA
Montana subscribes, at least in theory, to the pecuniary loss
rule28 and specifically refuses to compensate for grief.2 9 The pecu24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 465-66.
118 Eng. Rep. 35 (QB 1852).
Id. at 41-42.
Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co., 15 Mont. 1, 37 P. 838 (1894).
See e.g., Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 89-90, 500 P.2d
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niary loss rule today, however, is considerably broader than it
might sound. It includes not only the dollar contributions the survivors might have received, but also a monetary award for some of
the intangible losses caused them by the decedent's death. The
tangible losses include support and services, which are easily translated into a dollar value. The less tangible losses stray far from the
strict limitations placed on damages by the Blake case.
A.

The Development of the Rule

The Montana Supreme Court has decided a number of cases
dealing with the measure of damages for wrongful death. The court
has not handled the question consistently. If a trend exists, however, it seems to be toward approving awards for a wider range of
losses in wrongful death actions and granting the jury more discretion in computing the damages. It is useful to follow the development of the cases in Montana to see what basis the pecuniary loss
rule has in public policy.
In one of the earliest wrongful death cases, Soyer v. Great
Falls Water Co.,3 0 the trial court refused to permit the plaintiff to
prove the age of the decedent and that he was the husband and
father of the surviving heirs."1 The Montana court reversed, holding: "The measure of damages is the amount which the deceased
would probably have earned during his life for their [plaintiffs']
benefit, taking into consideration his age, ability, and disposition
to work, and his habits of living and expenditures . . . . ,8 The
court did not explain its ruling. It appeared to follow strictly the
Blake rule. The opinion contains no hint that there might be a
recovery for anything beyond mere contributions or support.
In 1908 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit predicted, in Butte Electric Ry. Co. v. Jones,3 3 that Montana
would "award damages as a pecuniary compensation only, and
could not take into consideration the grief of the son, nor make
any allowance for solace to him."3 4 The court allowed no recovery
for the son's mental anguish at his mother's death, but introduced
new elements of damage beyond simple monetary contributions.
The case was a son's action for the wrongful death of his mother.
397, 406
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

(1972).
Liston v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 500, 223 P. 507, 513 (1924).
15 Mont. 1, 37 P. 838 (1894).
Id. at 5, 37 P. at 839.
Id.
164 F. 308 (9th Cir. 1908).
Id. at 311.
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The son had quit school in the eighth grade and left home to work
as "a house boy or steward" living in his employers' homes. The
court let the jury consider evidence that the plaintiff's mother had
intended to provide further education for her son, even though he
had quit school. The court also allowed the jury to consider the
value of the home his mother had provided, even though plaintiff
had left it.33
The next three cases to reach the Montana court were decided
within four months of each other, and all adopted a broader measure of damages than their predecessors. The court further expanded the pecuniary loss rule beyond actual contributions.
The first case was Hollingsworth v. Davis-Daly Estates Copper Co.,36 in which the court approved an instruction that did not
limit damages to contributions but allowed the jury to "consider
any loss of comfort, society or protection of a father and husband,
• . . if it was of money value, you may allow pecuniary compensation. '3 7 Without citing authority, the Montana court expanded the
scope of damages beyond the Blake rule. The court implied, however, that there could be a loss of comfort, society or protection
without a pecuniary loss.
In Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co.,38 the same
issue was raised. The court ruled that the plaintiff could recover
for the pecuniary loss, "if any," caused by losing her husband's
comfort, protection, society and companionship.3 9 Again the court
implied that a jury may find these losses to have no pecuniary
value.
The third case, Dillon v. Great N. Ry. Co.,40 traces the lineage
of Montana's wrongful death act back to Lord Campbell's Act. It
distinguishes between a wrongful death suit and a survival action
and reaffirms recovery in a wrongful death action for "the loss of
companionship and the like."' 1
After these three cases Montana seemed committed to an expanded version of the pecuniary loss rule. None of the cases, however, discuss recovery for grief. The question does not appear to
have been raised.
Then the court, two months after Dillon, decided Yergy v. He35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 310-11.
38 Mont. 143, 99 P. 142 (1909).
Id. at 162, 99 P. at 149.
38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909).
Id. at 534-35, 100 P. at 974.
38 Mont. 485, 100 P. 960 (1909).
Id. at 493, 100 P. at 962.
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lena Light & Ry. Co.,"2 Montana's most bizarre opinion in this area
of law. The court did not fault the damage instructions limiting
recovery to contributions, because there had been no objection.' 8
The court refused to rule that the verdict was the result of passion
and prejudice, since it was within the range of the evidence offered
at trial." The court was shocked by the verdict's size, however, and
went out on its own to find out what had happened: "In this particular case we have felt justified, in view of the circumstances and
the fact that the information we seek is contained in public records
made by the plaintiff herself, and easily accessible, in pursuing an
extrajudicial inquiry. . .. ,,45 The court then used what it discovered in its own investigation to reduce the-verdict:
The result of this litigation will be that the sum recovered by the
plaintiff as executrix will simply be added to the fortune of which
she will come into possession when the estate is settled, and at
her death will go to persons who were in no way dependent upon
Mr. Yergy in his lifetime .... "
The rule of the case seems to be that the court will not allow a
verdict to stand if the survivors are otherwise cared for. To date
this approach has not been repeated, but there are hints that the
court is concerned with seeing that non-dependent survivors do
not receive a windfall.'7
In the following several years the Montana court continued to
apply the measure of damages outlined in Hollingsworth and
Mize. 8 One case, Gilman v. C. W. Dart Hardware Co.,"9 was an action by parents for the wrongful death of an 18-year-old daughter.
The court held that the parents should be allowed recovery for
contributions they might have received from their daughter after
her majority, even though the jury would have to speculate to compute those losses:
In estimating the pecuniary value of this child to her next of kin,
the jury could take into consideration all the probable, or even
possible, benefits which might result to them from her life, modified as in their estimation they should be, by all the chances of
42. 39 Mont. 212, 102 P. 310 (1909).
43. Id. at 241-42, 102 P. at 319-20.
44. Id. at 242, 102 P. at 320.
45. Id. at 242-43, 102 P. at 320.
46. Id. at 243, 102 P. at 320.
47. See e.g., Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P.2d 553 (1934),
in which the court stated, "It is not the policy of the law that the tragedy resulting in
[decedent's] death should endow her heirs." Id. at 65, 33 P.2d at 560.
48. See e.g., Neary v. Northern Pacific Ry., 41 Mont. 480, 506, 110 P. 226, 236 (1910).
49. 42 Mont. 96, 111 P. 550 (1910).
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failure and misfortune. There is no rule but their own good sense
for their guidance . . .
The Gilman case does not allow the jury to compensate the parents for their own suffering. It recognizes that the pecuniary loss
rule requires the jury to speculate.
In the next two cases, the court reviewed verdicts returned
under instructions that limited recovery to contributions only. In
both cases, the instructions were given without objection, and the
court did not comment on their propriety. "1 In 1923," the court
held that wrongful death recovery encompasses compensation for
"loss of comfort, protection and companionship as well as for loss
of support," even though plaintiff had only asked for an instruction on damages for loss of support."
Then came Liston v. Reynolds." Without citing authority, the
court approved the trial court's instruction in a wrongful death
case brought by the father of a 20-year-old son: "They were further
instructed that they could not allow plaintiff any damages for
mental anguish, grief, or suffering, or loss of companionship and
association with the deceased . . . ."" The court was siding with
the majority of jurisdictions when it held, for the first time, that
there is no recovery for grief in Montana. However, the court gave
no explanation for so holding. It also apparently reversed itself and
denied recovery for companionship and association, even though it
had earlier allowed such recovery.56 The court used its new rule to
57
reduce the verdict.
In the next series of cases, however, the Liston holding on recovery for loss of companionship seems to have been forgotten. Reviewing a verdict for the parents of a seven-year-old boy in Burns
8 the court affirmed
v. Eminger,5
an award including recovery for
loss of comfort. Again it held that the speculative nature of awards
is no objection:
[A]ny award must, of necessity be based upon conjecture and
50. Id. at 100, 111 P. at 551.
51. Hall v. Northern Pacific Ry., 56 Mont. 537, 546-47, 186 P. 340, 343-44 (1919). Hollenback v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 46 Mont. 559, 570, 129 P. 1058, 1061 (1913).
52. Anderson v. Wirkman, 67 Mont. 176, 215 P. 224 (1923).
53. Id. at 188, 215 P. at 228.
54. 69 Mont. 480, 223 P. 507 (1924).
55. Id. at 501-02, 223 P. at 513.
56. Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 534-35, 100 P. 971, 974
(1909); Hollingsworth v. Davis-Daly Estates Copper Co., 38 Mont. 143, 162, 99 P. 142, 149
(1909).
57. Liston, 69 Mont. at 502, 223 P. at 513.
58. 84 Mont. 397, 276 P. 437 (1929).
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surmise, and any amount of testimony would be of little aid to
the jury. The matter must be left largely to the judgment and
common sense of the ordinary jury left to decide it .... To hold
that, without such direct evidence [of specific pecuniary loss] no
recovery beyond nominal damages could be had, would render
nugatory the statute permitting a recovery for wrongful death
• . .as applied to the loss of a child of tender years ....59
A short time later, a federal court applying Montana law followed the rule set out in Mize,60 allowing recovery for society and
comfort and adding two new elements-"care" and "advice"-to
the list of items the jury may consider. 1
Later cases clarified some details of how the pecuniary loss
rule works. For example, there is only one action for wrongful
death, regardless of the number of survivors. 2 Counsel may use
the "per diem" approach to argue damages.6 3 The court specifically
ruled that economic testimony is admissible to prove future earnings, even though the testimony may be speculative in nature. 4
And it reaffirmed the right to recover for loss of society, comfort,
protection and companionship. 5
The implication of earlier cases that there might be no pecuniary loss even though there was a loss of comfort, society and protection had an effect in a series of cases in the late 1960s. In one,
Miller v.Boeing Co., 6 a federal court apparently reduced a verdict
in part because "[t]here was no attempt to show any facts which
might tend to establish a pecuniary value for the loss of comfort,
society and protection . . . . The Miller court believed that specific proof must be made of the pecuniary value of these intangible
losses. The precedential value of that decision, however, was eliminated when the Montana Supreme Court held in 1968:
[Als to the third item, loss of society, comfort, care and protection ... no extensive proof was made except that the son was a
normal child. It is obvious that to put a monetary value on this is
something solely within the province of the jury. 8
59. Id. at 411-12, 276 P. at 443.
60. Hennessey v. Burlington Transport Co., 103 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1950).
61. Id. at 665.
62, State ex rel. Carroll v. District Court, 139 Mont. 367, 370, 364 P.2d 739, 741
(1961).
63. Wyant v. Dunn, 140 Mont. 181, 187, 368 P.2d 917, 920 (1962).
64. Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 496-97, 402 P.2d 979, 982 (1965).
65. Davis v. Smith, 152 Mont. 170, 174, 448 P.2d 133, 135 (1968); Sanders v. Mount
Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 89-90, 500 P.2d 397, 406 (1972).
66. 245 F. Supp. 178 (D. Mont. 1965).
67. Id. at 182.
68. Davis v. Smith, 152 Mont. 170, 174, 448 P.2d 133, 135 (1968).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/3

10

DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

1982]

Strong and Jacobsen: Damages for Wrongful Death

The rule appears to be that once the jury has speculated their
award will stand.
The extent of the jury's discretion was outlined in Davis v.
Smith," a case which illustrates the inadequacy of the pecuniary
loss rule. The jury returned an award of $4,000 for the wrongful
death of a 15-year-old boy. Funeral expenses alone were $1,605.
The district court had granted a new trial because the verdict was
"ridiculously low"; 70 the supreme court reversed. Determining the
value for the loss of society, comfort, care and protection was held
to be "solely within the province of the jury. ' 71 Since the jury's
verdict was in excess "of the actual, determinable and nonspeculative damages," it would not be disturbed. 2 Apparently, a new trial
would be proper only if no award was made at all beyond the actual, determinable, nonspeculative damages. 3
A few landmarks are visible in this fog of cases. Montana's pecuniary loss rule started out denying recovery for all losses except
specific pecuniary contributions. However, the recovery rules have
been broadened. The survivors may recover damages for some of
the intangible losses they have suffered. The courts rely upon the
good sense of the jury and allow it to speculate about probabilities
and even possibilities. But the jury is forbidden to listen to the
survivors testify about their own suffering and evaluate that loss.
Economists may predict the future earnings of deceased children
but their parents may not tell of the specific emotional problems
the loss has caused them, regardless of how severe. Just how sharp
is the line between these two kinds of losses and the evidence
which supports each? The answer requires an examination of the
specific elements of loss now compensable in Montana.
B.

The Elements of Wrongful Death Damages

Over the years the Montana court has identified a number of
specific elements of damages that are allowed in death actions as
compensation for pecuniary loss. This section examines the elements of loss which are classified as pecuniary and, therefore, compensable in wrongful death cases.
Certain damages awarded under Montana law, such as funeral
69. 152 Mont. 170, 448 P.2d 133 (1968).
70. Id. at 172-73, 448 P.2d at 134.
71. Id. at 174, 448 P.2d at 135.
72. Id. at 178, 448 P.2d at 137.
73. See Putnam v. Pollei, 153 Mont. 406, 457 P.2d 776 (1969) (a survival action, where
a plaintiff's verdict for only the value of the deceased's personal belongings was reversed as
not supported by the evidence, since there was no award for lost earning capacity).
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expenses and loss of support, obviously fit within the concept of
compensation for pecuniary loss. Some elements, such as loss of
services, can be readily translated into pecuniary terms by referring to the cost of hiring such services. Other elements of compensable damages, such as loss of society, comfort and companionship,
strain the idea of pecuniary loss beyond the bounds of common
sense and logic.
1.

Medical and FuneralExpenses

It has been held that the survivors of a decedent may recover
funeral and medical expenses which result from a wrongful death,
provided the expenses are reasonable. 4 This element of damages
requires no explanation and is clearly in accordance with the concept of compensating a pecuniary loss incurred by the decedent's
survivors.
2.

Support, Maintenance, Contributions

Damages for loss of support, maintenance or contribution aim
at compensating those survivors who could reasonably have expected to receive financial support from the decedent, had he
lived, but who will be deprived of that support by his death.76
Damage awards of this type also fit logically within the concept of
providing relief for a pecuniary loss suffered by the decedent's survivors. This is the measure of damages that Blake allows.
Montana has long recognized recovery for loss of support in
wrongful death cases.7 Indeed, these damages are at the heart of
the typical wrongful death case; in fact they may constitute the
lion's share of a recovery. Support "includes all the financial contributions that [a] decedent would have made to his dependents
had he lived." 77 Most often, damages for loss of support are computed simply by looking at the earning potential of the decedent at
the time of his death and calculating what the survivors could have
expected to receive from his future earnings. 78
In determining the amount to be awarded for loss of support,
the jury may consider a variety of factors, including the decedent's
"capacity to earn money, his age at death, his disposition to work,
his habits of life and living, and his own expenditures,"' as well as
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Hennessey v. Burlington Transport Co., 103 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Mont. 1950).
See 1 SPmsma, supra note 10, at § 3:5.
See Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co., 15 Mont. 1, 5, 37 P. 838, 839 (1894).
1 SPsisER, supra note 10, at § 3:5.
Id. §§ 3:5, 3:6.
Hollingsworth v. Davis-Daly Estates Copper Co., 38 Mont. 143, 162, 99 P. 142, 148
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the probable life expectancies of the decedent and his survivors.80
In Montana, moreover, a plaintiff seeking compensation for loss of
support is apparently not limited to a general formula for recovery;
rather, it seems that he may receive compensation for the loss of
specific types of support contributions, if proven. For example, it
has been held that a survivor may recover the costs of a college
education by proving that the decedent had the intent and ability
to provide for that education.8 '
3.

Services

Damages for wrongful death are not limited to the recovery of
a decedent's actual cash contributions. Another element easily understood in economic terms is "services." Compensation for pecuniary loss has been held to encompass the value of the "personal
services" that a decedent would have rendered to his survivors,"

such as "work . . . in the household." 8s As usual, the loss of ser-

vices is compensable only to the extent that it can be assigned a
pecuniary value. "The fair and reasonable value of the services...
is the proper criterion in estimating the damages.""
Theoretically, damage awards for loss of services do fit within
the Blake concept of providing relief for a pecuniary loss. However,
some less tangible losses have been called services. Their value
may be recovered under Montana law, even though they are difficult to measure by any pecuniary standard. For example, compensation is allowed for the value of providing "instruction,"8 5 "protection," ' 6 "advice

87

and "a good home."88 While these services

are undoubtedly valuable, and properly compensable, it strains
common sense to squeeze them into a system which purports to
compensate only pecuniary losses.
4. Society, Comfort, Companionship
Finally, Montana allows the award of damages to survivors for
the loss of society, comfort and companionship suffered because of
(1909).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Butte Electric Ry. v. Jones, 164 F. 308, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1908).
Hennessey v. Burlington Transport Co., 103 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Mont. 1950).
Id.
1 SPEISER, supra note 10, at § 3:46.
Neary v. Northern Pacific Ry., 41 Mont. 480, 506, 110 P. 226, 236 (1910).
Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 535, 100 P. 971, 974

(1909).
87.
88.

Hennessey v. Burlington Transport Co., 103 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Mont. 1950).
Butte Electric Ry. v. Jones, 164 F. 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1908).
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the decedent's death.8 9 Damages of this type seek to compensate
the survivors for the decedent's love, affection and care of which
they are deprived.9 0 In proving damages of this type, evidence centers on the nature of the relationship between the decedent and his
survivors. "Harmonious marital or family relations between the
parties involved should be shown, as well as common interest in
hobbies, scholarship, art, religion, social activities, and the like."9 1
Damages of this type simply cannot be harmonized with the
central concept governing damages for wrongful death, that only
pecuniary losses are compensable. The Montana court, however,
continues to insist that all losses, even loss of society, comfort and
companionship, may be compensated only to the extent they have
a pecuniary value. As the court stated in Sanders v. Mount Haggin
Livestock Co.:9
It is not possible to measure in exact terms of money the loss
which a surviving husband, wife, or child may have sustained
through being deprived of the comfort and society of the deceased
spouse or parent .... But, in fixing the amount, the jury is always bound by the fundamental rule that pecuniary damage is
the limit of recovery ....93
It is with damages of this last type that the pecuniary loss requirement becomes most strained. Society, comfort and companionship
are inherently valuable but inherently without pecuniary measure.
It makes no sense to limit juries to considering these items of damages in such a strained fashion. In allowing damage awards for lost
affections, the courts recognize that the emotional impact of a
wrongful death should be compensated. However, by clinging to
the traditional measure of pecuniary loss, the courts have assured
that damages for lost society, comfort and companionship will be
awarded illogically and inadequately. By refusing to consider the
actual emotional damage to the survivors and the impact on their
lives, the courts deprive the jury of the concrete evidence to measure the loss. The traditional rules governing damages for wrongful
death should, therefore, be changed.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE RULE
The pecuniary loss rule allows survivors to recover only their
89.
(1909).
90.
91.
92.
93.

Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 38 Mont. 521, 535, 100 P. 971, 974
See 1 SPEISER, supra note 10, at § 3:49.
Id. at § 3:50.
160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972).
Id. at 90, 500 P.2d at 406.
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derivative losses. They may not recover for their own personal
damage. A jury can speculate about the future contributions to the
parents of a two-year-old and the pecuniary value of such a vague
concept as "protection." A jury can reduce the value of moral
training to a dollar sum. Nonetheless, juries cannot compensate
the survivors for their mental anguish, no matter how great or even
disabling. No compelling policy justifies this result. The rule has
only historical support, without logical or policy foundation. Juries
may be ignoring it. The rule has been abandoned in other jurisdictions, and there is no reason why Montana should not do the same.
A.

Only History Supports the Rule

There is no doubt that the pecuniary loss rule, with its corollary that grief is not compensable, is the majority rule and has
been since the Blake case. But history alone does not justify a rule
of law that serves no purpose.
The Blake case's underpinnings have disappeared with time.
Survival statutes have been enacted in most jurisdictions to continue the decedent's own personal injury action after his death.9
Montana's own survival statute was adopted in 1867, just 15 years
after the Blake case was decided." More significantly, the social
policies that may once have seemed to require such a rule no
longer exist. Those policies were traced by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in Wycko v. Gnodtke,9" a case involving the death of a
14-year-old boy. The Michigan court said:
The rulings reflect the philosophy of the times, its ideals, and its
social conditions. It was the generation of debtor's prisons, of
some 200 or more capital offenses, and of the public flogging of
women. It was an era when ample work could be found for the
agile bodies and nimble fingers of small children.
This then, was the day from which our precedents come, a
day when employment of children of tender years was the accepted practice and their pecuniary contributions to the family
both substantial and provable ....
That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to a parent
from his child should control our decisions today is a reproach to
justice. We are still turning, actually, for guidance in decision, to
"one of the darkest chapters in the history of childhood." Yet in
other areas of law the legal and social standards of 1846 are as
94.

See PROSSER, supra note 10, at 900. See also 2 SPEISER, supra note 10, at Appen-

dix A (for a listing "ofvarious survival statutes).
95.
96.

MCA § 27-1-501 (1981).
361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
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dead as the coachman and his postilions who guided the coaches
of its society through the dark and muddy streets, past the gibbets where still hung the toll of the day's executions."'
Nonetheless, the Blake rule, known as the pecuniary loss rule,
continues in effect. In Montana today a jury may award damages
for the pain, suffering, and mental and emotional dist ressof
a person who is dead but none for the similar anguish of those who are
still alive. What is the justification for continuing the rule?
Montana's Supreme Court has not hesitated to change the
common law when it believed doing so was in the public interest. 8
The obsolescence of the rule is perhaps best summarized by
the following quotation from a federal district court in Louisiana:
The distinction between the pain of a broken arm and the pain of
a broken heart is judge-made. It must be doubted that a jury
deemed competent and able to evaluate the exquisite anguish of a
compound fracture of the femur would find it more difficult to fix
just compensation for a cup filled with a widow's tears.
Human experience, as well as the literature of psychiatry and
psychology bear abundant evidence of the debilitating effect of
grief and the resultant depression. It is certainly no less real, and
no more difficult to appraise, than the mental and physical pain
and suffering attendant upon personal injury that is awarded to
those who survive, or the pain and suffering prior to death that is
recoverable as part of the death action here.0 9
However, the court there did not address one critical fact. A common law rule can be changed by common law courts.
Chief 4ustice Haswell's eloquent dissent in Consolidated
Freightways v. Osier,100 discussing a different common law rule, is
appropriate here:
The source of the rule ...

is the English common law ....

Be-

ing a rule of common law it is purely judge-made law. Judges created the rule by judicial decision and judges can change it in the
same manner ....

This approach is now as extinct as the dodo.

97. Id. at 335-37, 105 N.W.2d at 120-21.
98. See e.g., Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513
P.2d 268 (1973) (adopting strict liability in tort); Kussler v. Burlington N., Inc., Mont.
-, 606 P.2d 520 (1980) (allowing inquiry into the intent with which a general release was
given); Corrigan v. Janney, -- Mont.626 P.2d 838 (1981) (overruling previous holdings
that the "repair and deduct" statute precludes a landlord's liability for condition of
premises).
99. In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652, 656 (E.D. La. 1971), quoted in 1
SPEISER, supra note 10, at § 3:55.
100. Consolidated Freightways v. Osier, Mont. -,
605 P.2d 1076, 1082 (1979)
(contributions among joint tortfeasors).
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Montana's 1972 Constitution guarantees access to the courts to
all persons and speedy recovery afforded for every injury of person, property or character. Art. II, Sec. 16, 1972 Mont. Con. When
the reasons for the rule no longer exist the rule itself fails. Section
1-3-201, MCA. 0 1
Judicial change of judge-made law is not new in Montana.
The wrongful death statute itself specifies only that such damages may be recovered as are just.102 This rule starting with Blake
and Miller, and continuing through Soyer and Liston in Montana,
is one of court creation. Just as courts have created the rule, so
they can change it when it is outmoded. Here, in the archaic refusal to compensate for grief, is further need for the court to act.
B.

Other JurisdictionsAllow Recovery for the Mental Anguish
of Survivors

It is not impossible to compensate the survivors for their grief.
Not all jurisdictions follow the pecuniary loss rule. One court has
stated:
The existence of mental suffering by a parent for the loss of a
child is a fact so universal and general that it also may be fairly
assumed and recognized as existing ....
The extent of the distress and sorrow may not be susceptible of direct or exact measurement, but enough certainty and knowledge of the situation
can be established through the same introduction of testimony, to
furnish the basis for a verdict or judgment. 103
A number of jurisdictions do allow compensation for mental
anguish,'4and include Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Maryland and
West Virginia, as well as Louisiana and the countries of France,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Japan. 10 5
C.

Juries Regularly Evaluate Mental Anguish

Juries today evaluate and award damages for mental anguish.
In the routine personal injury action in Montana the damages include an award for the mental anguish the injury causes.'" The
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is now widely
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
MCA § 27-1-323 (1981).
Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 1074, 34 So. 91, 93 (1903).
1 SPEISER, supra note 10, at § 3:53.
Id. at § 3:54.
MONTANA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE, Instruction 30.01, Damages for Mental,

Physical Pain, and Suffering.
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recognized.1 0 7 The importance of compensating people for mental
anguish wrongfully caused them has led two states, California108
and Hawaii,109 to recognize an entirely new tort. There, juries are
allowed to evaluate damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress, even though the plaintiff is not otherwise injured. The California Supreme Court has stated: "[T]his is a matter of proof to be
presented to the trier of fact. The screening of claims on this basis
at the pleading stage is an usurpation of the jury's function."110
Those states allow anyone to recover for emotional distress caused
by negligence, even if no physical injury occurs. In doing so, they
go far beyond the approach this article advocates-allowing recovery for negligently inflicted grief and emotional distress only when
the negligence results in a wrongful death.
In Montana, in a combined wrongful death and survival action, the survivors may come forward in a survival case to prove
and recover (through the deceased's estate) for the mental and
emotional anguish of the deceased. They may prove in the death
case all of the details of their own relationship with the deceased
to establish their loss of society, protection, comfort, companionship, care and advice. And there, the pecuniary loss rule stops
them. They may not prove their own suffering, though it is their
right which creates the wrongful death suit in the first place. All of
the facts which the Blake and Miller courts thought were impossible to prove are regularly being evaluated by juries, but not in
wrongful death cases. The result is that, in those cases, serious injuries go uncompensated.
D. Juries May Be Ignoring the Rule
A further reason exists for bandoning the traditional rule. Juries often ignore the rule when its application seems unfair. The
result is an arbitrary system, unfair to litigants. As Prosser noted:
This has been particularly [apparent] in the case of death of a
minor child, where the future is in the highest degree speculative
and uncertain. As any parent is well aware, any realistic view of
the prospects must mean that the cost of rearing the child will far
exceed any conceivable pecuniary benefits that might ever be optimistically expected of him; and damages calculated on this basis
could never be anything but a minus quantity. Nevertheless, in
107.

See e.g., extensive case citations in 38 Am.JUR. 2d Fright, Shock and Mental

Disturbance § 4 (1968);
108.
109.
110.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46(1).

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
Molien, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/3

18

1982]

DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
Strong and Jacobsen: Damages for Wrongful Death

such cases substantial verdicts have been sustained, where it is
very evident that the jury have taken the bull by the horns, and
in reality have compensated for the prohibited sentimental aspects of the family relation, with the court benevolently winking
at the flagrant violation of the rule it has laid down. There have
been similar cases as to aged decedents, already past the hope of
future earnings and contributions. Such decisions do not appear
very likely to command respect for the administration of justice;
but it seems evident that it is the theory which is wrong, and not
the result."'
There are several cases in Montana, all involving youthful decedents, which bear out Dean Prosser's observations. It is apparent
that Montana juries will ignore the rule when it seems unjust.
In Hollenback v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.,"' the
Montana court sustained a verdict of $18,000 in favor of a mother
for the death of her 19-year-old son. In Autio v. Miller,1 the court
held that a verdict of $15,000 was not excessive compensation for
the death of an eight-year-old boy. And, in Wyant v. Dunn, " ' a
case involving the wrongful death of a five-year-old boy, a verdict
of $15,195 was upheld. In each of these cases, the compensation
awarded the survivors clearly exceeded the pecuniary contributions
they could have expected from the decedent. In each case, the pecuniary loss rule was just as clearly ignored by all-the jury, the
trial judge and the appellate court.
There are other cases in which the rule requiring pecuniary
loss is more strictly followed. For instance, in Liston v. Reynolds,115 a verdict of only $5,500 was held excessive compensation
for the death of a 20-year-old. The court reduced the damage
award to $3,000. In Davis v. Smith, a $4,000 award including
$1,605 of funeral expenses was affirmed. 1 6 It is in this type of case,
where the phrase "pecuniary loss" is closely followed, that the inequities of the pecuniary loss limitation become apparent. Where
only meager sums are awarded for the most grievous of injuries,
the real losses of the decedent and his survivors go uncompensated. If a just result can be obtained only by ignoring the law, it is
time to change the law.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

PROSSER, supra note 10, at 908-09.

46 Mont. 559, 129 P. 1058 (1913).
92 Mont. 150, 11 P.2d 1039 (1932).
140 Mont. 181, 368 P.2d 917 (1962).
69 Mont. 480, 223 P. 507 (1924).
152 Mont. 170, 448 P.2d 133 (1968).
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E. The Rule Violates Basic Public Policy
Montana has recognized the worth of the individual as a basic
principle. The Montana Constitution in Article II, Section 4 provides: "The dignity of the human being is inviolable ....

,'1" Arti-

cle II, Section 16 commands: "Courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character." 118 Our statutes say: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care of skill in
the management of his property or person. . .

."I"

This combina-

tion of constitutional and statutory language has recently persuaded the Montana court to remove several restrictions on plaintiff's rights to prove their injuries. 20 No argument has been raised
that the mental and emotional anguish of grief is not an injury.
Nonetheless, our common law refuses to compensate that injury.
Such a rule may have been appropriate in nineteenth century England. It is out of place in twentieth century Montana.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rule preventing recovery for grief has no justification
aside from an old English pedigree. It prevents injured people from
recovering for their injuries. Juries regularly evaluate similar injuries. It is not necessary to revise the law totally. A rule that allows
survivors bringing wrongful death cases to prove all damages flowing from the death would certainly be fair. It would eliminate artificial distinctions and realistically compensate people who have
been injured.

117. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
118. MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 16.
119. MCA § 27-1-701 (1981).
120. See e.g., cases cited supra note 98, and Madison v. Yunker, Mont. -,
589
P.2d 126 (1978) (eliminating requirement of a demand for retraction before filing a libel
suit); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, Mont. -, 609 P.2d 257 (1980) (recognizing suit
for bad faith in adjusting and processing Workers Compensation claim).
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